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Botta Blondet: The Inconsistencies of Jespersen

THE COURT’S UNDUE BURDEN: A LOOK AT JESPERSEN AND
ITS INCONSISTENCIES
Alessandro Botta Blondet

I. INTRODUCTION
All over the country, some employers subject their employees to
specific dress and grooming requirements. Some of these requirements
may be for safety reasons, while others may be for portraying an image
that employers want to convey. Sometimes, employers want to portray a
professional image and will require professional attire to do so. Generally,
grooming policies are unisex and require employees to wear socially
accepted garments that are considered professional. This practice is
understandably acceptable for some employers. For instance, a law firm
would not want its attorneys to show up to a client meeting wearing gym
clothes. Sometimes, however, appearance and grooming codes can be
based on harmful stereotypes that have developed over time.
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Jespersen v.
Harrah,1 where Ms. Jespersen, the plaintiff, was fired because she refused
to wear makeup, which was required by the employer’s grooming policy.2
The court, relying on an “undue burdens” approach to grooming codes,
ruled that the employer could require that its female employees wear
makeup because the requirement did not place an unequal burden on
women as compared to men.3 Part of that policy required men to keep
their hair a certain length.4 Therefore, because the policy placed different,
but essentially equal burdens on both sexes, the court held that the makeup
requirement did not violate Title VII, despite being based on the
stereotype that women need to wear makeup to look polished.
Other circuits, however, have declined to follow the logic in
Jespersen.5 At least one circuit court has relied on Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,6 to hold that discrimination based on a sex stereotype is
forbidden.7
Given this predicament and the ruling in Jespersen, the undue burdens
test it relies on raises doubts on its consistency with Title VII and on the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1107-8
Id. at 1109-10.
Id. at 1108.
See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id.
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results it can yield. Therefore, this Article argues that the undue burdens
approach is flawed and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and
with the overall purpose of Title VII. This Article also argues that
employers already have an avenue towards legal discrimination under the
bona fide occupational qualification defense. Further, this Article argues
that even under the undue burdens approach used by the Ninth Circuit,
the makeup requirement in defendant’s policy places an expense on
women that is not placed on men and is therefore an unequal burden.
Finally, this Article provides some possible solutions to this problem and
makes predictions about the future of this particular area of employment
law.
II. BACKGROUND
This section discusses Title VII and its intent followed by a brief
discussion of disparate treatment claims. Then, it explains the relevant
frameworks applied to employment discrimination cases, followed by an
overview of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the legislation that
followed, which slightly altered its holding. Next, this section outlines the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., followed by the Sixth Circuit’s Smith v. City of Salem
decision, both of which reached different conclusions. This section then
explains the very narrow bona fide occupational qualification defense
available to employers who discriminate. Finally, this section looks at
some criticisms and proposed solutions to the unequal burdens approach
used by the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen.
A. Title VII.
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the intent to confer
jurisdiction on federal district courts of the United States to provide
injunctive relief against discrimination, to authorize the Attorney General
to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and
public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, and to
establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity.8 As a means
to effectuate these goals, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

8. 88 P.L. 352, 78 Stat. 241.
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origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.9
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, the Supreme Court has
pointed out that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they match a stereotype
associated in their group . . . Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.”10
B. Frameworks Under Title VII: Direct or Circumstantial Evidence and
Single or Multiple Motivating Factors.
Employment law can be complex because of the many frameworks that
the courts have created over the years to analyze claims of discrimination.
Most cases under Title VII are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
and not 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).11 Two ways employers can argue
claims under these statutes are disparate treatment and disparate impact.12
In a disparate treatment claim, an employee alleges that his or her
employer treats some employees less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion or other protected characteristics. 13 Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can be inferred from
differences in treatment.14 On the other hand, disparate impact involves
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another.15 For disparate impact claims, a plaintiff need not prove intent.16
If a plaintiff has direct evidence that an employer discriminated against
it, then that plaintiff’s case is examined in a straightforward way. 17 Direct
evidence is evidence that if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue
without interferences or presumption and is composed of the most blatant

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

42 USCS § 2000e-2(a).
Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978).
United States EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 860 F.3d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 2017).
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).
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remarks whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate.18
However, if a plaintiff only has circumstantial evidence, that case could
be decided under the McDonnell Douglass framework (if it’s a single
motive case) or under the Price Waterhouse framework and the
amendments that followed (if employer had multiple motivating factors
in its decision to adversely affect an employee). Circumstantial evidence
is evidence that allows a jury to infer that a fact is true rather than directly
supporting the truth of that fact.19
In a single motive McDonnell Douglass framework, the plaintiff
initially has the burden of production and persuasion on a preponderance
of the evidence, and has to make out a prima facie case by showing that:
(1) he/she was in a protected class; (2) he/she is qualified for the position
at issue;20 (3) despite his/her qualifications, he/she was fired, and; (4)
similarity situated employees outside the protected class receive better
treatment that him/her.21 To be considered similarly situated, employees
must be comparable in all material respects, such as having the same
supervisor, engaging in similar conduct, and being subjected to the same
standards.22 However, some courts use the “enough common features”
analysis.23 Meeting these elements creates a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination.24
After the employee makes a prima facie showing, the burden of
production shifts to the employer, who must articulate some legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.25 There is
no credibility determination here; the bar is low, and the employer has to
provide a non-discriminatory reason for the termination.26
After an employer provides its evidence, the burden of production
reverts back to the plaintiff, who must then show that the employer’s
reasons for the adverse employment action are pretext for
discrimination.27 An employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter
of law if: (1) the record conclusively revealed some other, non18. Sperino, Et al.., Employment Discrimination A Context and Practice Casebook at 56 (2nd ed.
2014) (defining direct and circumstantial evidence and noting that direct evidence cases are rare).
19. Id.
20. Id. The qualifications must be the objective minimal qualifications unless a specific training is
required for a position.
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (fn. 13 says these elements will
differ from case to case depending on the facts and circumstances).
22. Brown v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Resources, 499 F.3d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 2007).
23. Elkhatib v Dunkin Donuts, Inc, 493 F3d 827, 831 (7th Cir 2007).
24. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-3.
25. Id. Adverse employment actions include failure to hire, termination, failure to promote, or
demotion. Sperino, Et al., Employment Discrimination A Context and Practice Casebook 74 (2nd ed.
2014).
26. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-3.
27. Id. at 804.
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discriminatory reason for the employer’s decision; or (2) the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was
untrue and there was an abundance of evidence showing discrimination
did not occur.28
When an employer accounts for multiple motivating factors in its
decision to fire or demote an employee, the proper framework comes from
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the 1991 amendments to Title VII.29 In
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,30 the plaintiff, Ms. Hopkins, brought suit
under Title VII alleging that the firm had discriminated against her by not
making her a partner on the basis of her sex.31 Ms. Hopkins was regarded
as an excellent employee and even helped defendant secure a $25 million
contract with the Department of Defense.32 The lower court even pointed
out that no other candidate for partnership with the firm had a similar
work record.33 However, Ms. Hopkins was alleged to have bad
interpersonal skills and was unduly harsh with her fellow employees and
staff.34 Nonetheless, some of the partners reviewing Ms. Hopkins
partnership candidacy reacted negatively towards her because she was a
woman.35 Some of the comments made by these partners referred to her
as being “macho,” that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” and
that she needed to take “a course at charm school.”36 Ms. Hopkins was
told that if she wanted to improve her partnership chances, she should
walk, talk, and dress more femininely, wear more jewelry, and style her
hair.37
The District Court eventually found that Price Waterhouse had
unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by
consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments that
resulted from sex stereotyping.38 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision, but departed from the District Court’s reasoning, holding that
the employer needed to prove their case by clear and convincing
evidence.39
A Supreme Court plurality disagreed and ruled that once a plaintiff has
established that gender played a motivating part in an employment
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See Id. at 792.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 234-5.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 237.
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decision, a defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.40
Further, it pointed out that “in the context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts of the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” 41
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse, the
legislature passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which affirmed that the
mixed-motives analysis was appropriate under Title VII but made some
changes to the remedies available to plaintiffs. 42 The Act now provides
limited remedies if the employer proves an affirmative defense.43 Before
the 1991 amendments, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price
Waterhouse, a plaintiff would get nothing if the defendant proved an
affirmative defense.44
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Jespersen Decision.
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.45 was a case about appearance
and grooming standards in the employment context. In this case, Ms.
Jespersen worked as a bartender for defendant Harrah, a hotel casino, for
over twenty years and had an exemplary record.46 It was not until the year
2000 that defendant implemented a “personal best” grooming and
appearance policy.47 The policy contained appearance standards that
applied equally to both sexes and included a standard black uniform.48
The policy also contained some sex-differentiated appearance
requirements, such as hair, nails, and makeup.49 Bartenders and bar-backs
working at Harrah had to adhere to additional guidelines.50 The following
guidelines applied to both sexes: jewelry, if issued, must be worn, simple
jewelry was permitted, no large chokers, chains, or bracelets.51 The
guidelines also called for no faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors.52 For
male employees, their hair must not extend below the top of the shirt
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 258.
Id. at 250.
PL 102–166, November 21, 1991, 105 Stat 1071; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
Id.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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collar, ponytails were prohibited, hands and fingernails must be clean and
trimmed, no colored nail polish was permitted, and no eye and facial
makeup was permitted, among other things.53 For female employees, hair
had to be teased, curled, or styled everyday they worked, their nails had
to be polished, makeup had to be worn and applied neatly in
complementary colors, and lipstick had to be worn.54
Ms. Jespersen did not wear makeup on or off the job and stated that
wearing it conflicted with her self-image and ability to perform her job as
a bartender.55 She even testified that the makeup requirement “affected
her dignity and took away her credibility as an individual and as a
person.”56 Unwilling to meet the makeup requirement, Ms. Jespersen left
her employment with the defendant.57 She then filed suit alleging that the
“personal best” policy discriminated against women by subjecting them
to terms and conditions of employment to which men are not, and
requiring that women conform to sex-based stereotypes as a term and
condition of employment.58
In response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgement, Ms.
Jespersen relied solely on her testimony to establish that the “personal
best” policy caused unequal burdens on women compared to men.59 The
District Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement
and Ms. Jespersen appealed.60
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgement.61 Regarding
Jespersen’s claim that the makeup policy discriminated against women
and not men, the court stated that sex-based differences in appearance
standards alone without a showing of disparate effect does not create a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.62 The court stated that
appearance standards that impose different, but essentially equal, burdens
on both sexes is not disparate treatment.63 However, if a policy applies
less favorably to one gender and those burdens are obvious from the
policy itself, then disparate treatment is evident.64 Finally, the court held
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1108.
56. Id.
57. Id. It is unclear whether she quit or if she was fired, on page 1107 the court says the “left her
employment,” but on page 1114 the dissenting judge says, “Harrah fired her.”
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1109.
63. Id. at 1110. “[W]here . . . such [grooming and appearance] policies are reasonable and are
imposed in an evenhanded manner om all employees, slight differences in the appearance requirements .
. . have only a negligible effect on employment opportunities.
64. Id. at 1109.
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that the settled law on grooming codes is not whether the policies between
both sexes are different, but whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff
creates an unequal burden for the plaintiff’s gender.65
The court refused to take judicial notice of the fact that it takes more
time and money for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement
than it takes a man to comply with the short hair requirement,66 which
ultimately cost Jespersen her case.67
Regarding Jespersen’s sex stereotyping claim, the Ninth Circuit
differentiated the facts from the case to those from Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.68 The court noted the facts in Jespersen were different in that
defendant’s “personal best” policy did not single out Jespersen in the
same manner that Ms. Hopkins was.69 In Jespersen, the overall policy
requires all bartenders to wear the same uniform and it is, for the most
part, unisex.70 Further, there was no evidence that the policy was enacted
to make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted
stereotypical image of what women should wear.71 Thus, the court
concluded that summary judgment was properly granted.72 However, the
court noted that it did not preclude sex-stereotyping claims on the basis
of dress or appearance codes, just that no evidence of stereotypical
motivation was found here.73
The dissenting judges stated their belief that the policy was motivated
by sex stereotyping and that Jespersen’s termination was due to her sex.74
The dissent noted that a policy containing sex-differentiated requirements
affecting people of both genders does not excuse a particular requirement
from scrutiny.75 A refusal to consider the makeup requirement separately
would allow “otherwise impermissible gender stereotypes to be
neutralized by the presence of a stereotype or burden that affects people
of the opposite gender.”76 Further, Judge Kozinski, dissenting, pointed
out that the makeup policy was substantially more burdensome for
women than for men in that purchasing and putting on makeup takes time
and money, and that there was no similar male requirement.77
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1114-8.
Id at 1114.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id. at 1117.
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D. The Sixth Circuit’s Smith Decision.
In Smith v. City of Salem,78 a transsexual plaintiff sued the City of
Salem and various city officials for discrimination on the basis of sex. 79
The plaintiff worked for the City of Salem, Ohio, as a lieutenant in the
Fire Department for seven years without any negative incidents.80 The
plaintiff, who is biologically and by birth a male, is a transsexual and has
been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”).81 After the
plaintiff was diagnosed with GID, she began to express a more feminine
appearance on a regular basis, including at work.82 The plaintiff’s coworkers started to notice the change and began making comments.83 The
plaintiff’s supervisors, named defendants in this action, eventually met
and discussed options on how to terminate the plaintiff.84 At the meeting,
defendants agreed to arrange for the Salem Civil Service Commission to
require the plaintiff to undergo three separate psychological evaluations.85
Defendants hoped that the plaintiff would either resign or refuse to
comply.86 If she refused to comply, defendants reasoned, it could
terminate the plaintiff’s employment for insubordination.87
One of the plaintiff’s supervisors disagreed with the rest and labeled
defendants’ plan a “witch hunt.”88 This supervisor warned the plaintiff
about the meeting’s resolution, which prompted the plaintiff to seek
counsel.89 The plaintiff’s counsel warned defendants about the legal
repercussion of their decision.90 Defendants suspended the plaintiff for a
24-hour period based on an alleged infraction of the city’s policy. 91 At the
hearing for the suspension, the commission upheld the suspension, which
was eventually appealed.92 The plaintiff then brought suit asserting sex
discrimination under Title VII, among other claims.93

78. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
79. Id. at 567-8.
80. Id. at 568.
81. Id. The American Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an
individual's sexual organs and sexual identity. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 576-582 (4th ed. 2000).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 569.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had established a Title VII
prima facie case of discrimination.94 Following this determination, the
court relied on Price Waterhouse to determine whether the plaintiff
properly alleged a claim of sex stereotyping. 95 The court noted that, under
Price Waterhouse, discrimination because of “sex” includes gender
discrimination96 and emphasized that “we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group.”97 With this in mind,
the court found that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded claims of sex
stereotyping and gender discrimination because of the allegations that her
failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look
and behave were the driving force behind defendants' actions.98
The court noted that “[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who
discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear
dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the
discrimination would not occur but-for the victim's sex.”99
Fourteen years after its Smith decision, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its
views on sex stereotyping in EEOC v. R.G..100 In that case, the court stated
that “even if we would permit certain sex-specific dress codes in a case
where the issue was properly raised, we would not rely on either
Jespersen or Barker to do so.”101 Further, the court noted that Smith and
Jespersen are irreconcilable with one another because the Sixth Circuit’s
ruling in Smith reaches the opposite conclusion: that requiring women to
wear makeup does, in fact, constitute improper sex stereotyping.102
Finally, the court stated that Jespersen’s incompatibility with Smith may
explain why the Sixth Circuit has never endorsed it or cited to it, and why
it should not be followed now.103
F. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”).
A bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) is a defense to
employment discrimination that is available to employers. 104 This defense
is very narrow, and it states that:
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 571.
Id.
Id., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
Smith, 378 F.3d at 572, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
Smith, 378 F.3d at 572.
Id. at 575.
No. 16-2424, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5720 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
42 USC §20002-2(e).
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[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify .
. . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupation qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.105
Initially, courts constructing a BFOQ standard required that an
employer prove that “all or substantially all” protected members would
be unable to fulfill the requisite job duties. For example, in Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., an employer excluded women
from positions requiring employees to lift more than thirty pounds.106 The
court rejected this policy because the employer could not show that almost
all women were unable to lift thirty pounds.107 The Fifth Circuit explained
that “to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception, an
employer has the burden of proving that it had reasonable cause to
believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform, safely and efficiently, the duties of
the job involved.”108
Two years after establishing the “all or substantially all” test, the Fifth
Circuit, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., created another
test, called the “essence of the business” test, to determine whether a
BFOQ was properly established.109 In that case, employer Pan American
maintained a policy of exclusively hiring females for its flight attendant
positions.110 The court held that that “[d]iscrimination based on sex is
valid only when the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.”111 The court
ruled that females may be better suited to fulfill the required duties of the
position, but that the essence of the business test was not fulfilled because
transporting passengers safely from one place to another, the essence of
the airline business, could be accomplished by males without seriously
affecting the operation of an airline.112
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court gave its express approval
to both standards, but employers only need to successfully assert one of

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
408 F.2d 228, 232-4 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 235-6.
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 388.
Id.
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them.113 After the Supreme Court authorized the use of both analyses,
courts began to employ both tests concurrently as they focus on different
considerations. The essence of the business test considers whether the
employee’s desired trait is essential for the business to run successfully,
while the all or substantially all test focuses on whether a class-based ban
is the only feasible method of revealing those unable to perform the job.
Often, courts require a third prerequisite, mandating that defendants
also show that no reasonable, less discriminatory alternative exists,
especially in cases where privacy is at issue.114 This third prerequisite is
beyond the scope of this Article’s argument.
The EEOC has also issued regulations pertaining to the use of the
BFOQ defense.115 For instance, employers cannot claim BFOQ when
they refuse to hire a woman because of assumptions of the comparative
employment characteristics of women,116 stereotyped characterization of
the sexes, or refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, or its clients.117
G. Scholarship Criticisms of Jespersen.
In 2006, an article titled Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth
Circuit's Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated
Grooming Standards under Title VII118 criticized the Jespersen decision.
Author William Miller had two main arguments. First, he argued that the
unequal burdens approach used in Jespersen allows harmful
discrimination caused by sex-differentiated grooming standards to persist
as long as the discriminatory burden is balanced against a corresponding
burden on the other gender.119 Specifically, Miller noted that a strict
adherence to the unequal burdens approach allows the most offensive sex
discrimination to go unchecked so long as employees of the other gender
are subjected to comparable time and cost burdens.120 For instance, a
grooming standard requiring women to wear sexually revealing outfits,
while requiring men to wear business casual attire constitutes harmful
discrimination, however, under a strict application of the unequal burdens
test, the policy would not violate Title VII because it does not impose a
113. 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
114. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a).
116. Id. For example, the assumption of a higher turnover rate among women.
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a).
118. William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit's Unequal Burdens
Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1357
(2006).
119. Id. at 1360.
120. Id. at 1361-2.
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greater time or cost burden on one gender relative to the other.121
Second, Miller argued that the unequal burdens test is artificial because
it fails to address the persistence of sex stereotypes, the real burden
created by grooming standards.122 Miller suggests that by weighing only
time and cost burdens, courts ignore the feelings of degradation that
accompany grooming standards based on harmful prejudices and
stereotypes.123 Under the unequal burdens test, harmful sex stereotypes
go unchecked and continue to adversely impact employees because the
test does not consider whether the grooming policy perpetuates harmful
stereotypes.124
As an alternative to the unequal burdens approach, Miller suggests that
courts apply Price Waterhouse to grooming standard cases to determine
whether those standards perpetuate outmoded, archaic sex stereotypes
that serve to disadvantage or stigmatize one gender.125 After making this
determination, he argues that courts should apply the unequal burdens
test.126
III. ARGUMENT
This section is divided into five sub-sections. The first sub-section
argues that the holding and reasoning in Jespersen is incompatible with
the Supreme Court ruling in Price Waterhouse. The second sub-section
argues that even if the “undue burdens” approach is compatible with Price
Waterhouse, the “undue burdens” approach is flawed. The third subsection argues that the “undue burdens approach” is not needed because
an exception to sex discrimination already exists through the BFOQ
defense. The fourth subsection argues that even if the “undue burdens”
approach is correct, the result in Jespersen is not because it costs more
money for women than for men to adhere to Harrah’s policy. The fifth
and final subsection offers some solutions for employers in their use of
grooming codes and policies.
A. The “Undue Burdens” Test Used in Jespersen is Incompatible with
Supreme Court Precedent.
In Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit held that grooming standards that
impose different but equal burdens on both sexes does not violate Title
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1365-6.
Id. at 1366.
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VII.127 Harrah’s policy prescribed the manner in which its employees
were to carry themselves.128 Men had to have short, natural hair, and no
makeup, among other things.129 On the other hand, women’s hair had to
be styled, nail polished was to be worn, and makeup was a requirement.130
Ms. Jespersen challenged the makeup requirement, stating that she never
personally wore it and that she felt demeaned every time she did.131
Harrah would not excuse plaintiff from the makeup requirement, which
led to Ms. Jespersen’s termination.132
In rejecting Ms. Jespersen’s sex discrimination claims, the Ninth
Circuit differentiated this case from Price Waterhouse by pointing out
that Harrah did not single out Ms. Jespersen in the same manner that the
defendant in Price Waterhouse did with Ms. Hopkins because the policy
in Jespersen was mostly unisex.133 Recall that in Price Waterhouse, the
sex discrimination was not a policy but the comments and promotion
criteria the partners took into account when making a decision.134 The
Ninth Circuit also noted that it found no evidence that the policy was
adopted to force women to conform to a stereotype.135
These findings and conclusions, however, are flawed and incompatible
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse. The Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse stated that discrimination because of “sex”
includes gender discrimination and that “we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group.” 136 The defendant in
Jespersen violated this language directly by requiring women to conform
to the stereotype that to look professional, women require makeup. It does
not make a difference that the policies at issue in both cases differ, what
matters is that they are discriminatory “because of sex.” The Ninth
Circuit’s “undue burdens” test is irrelevant in determining that Harrah
discriminated against Ms. Jespersen because of sex. By requiring her to
conform to a stereotype, Harrah violated Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit in Smith and later in R.G. was wise enough to
recognize that the “undue burdens” approach is incorrect. In Smith, the
court explicitly stated that requiring women to wear makeup is sex
discrimination because it would not occur but for the employee’s sex. In
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1111-2.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 235 (1989).
Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1113.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
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R.G., the Sixth Circuit confirmed this holding and stated that it would
never cite to Jespersen and that other circuits should refrain from doing
so.137
Thus, the undue burdens test used in Jespersen is inconsistent with
Price Waterhouse because it is based on a harmful sex stereotype, which
the Supreme Court explicitly prohibited.
B. The “Undue Burdens” Approach is Flawed.
The Ninth Circuit in Jespersen relied on the “undue burdens” test to
hold that Harrah had not discriminated against Ms. Jespersen because of
her sex.138 The undue burdens test states that appearance standards that
impose different but essentially equal burdens on both sexes does not
violate Title VII.139 However, this approach is flawed because it allows
for sex discrimination to occur as long both sexes are affected evenly. For
instance, if an employer required men to be over 200lbs and women to be
under 120lbs because men should be bigger than women and women
should be smaller than men, under a pure application of the undue burdens
test, this would not be discriminatory despite its clear discriminatory
nature. Under the undue burdens test, both sexes in this scenario are
evenly affected in a negative manner. Thus, even if the policy may seem
discriminatory, the undue burdens test would find that this policy would
not because both sexes are evenly affected.
The purpose of Title VII is to rid the workplace of all types of
discrimination.140 Under the undue burdens approach, discrimination
would be allowed to continue as long as it is equal on both sexes. This
result is inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII. However, as noted
above, applying the Price Waterhouse approach would solve this
problem. If an employer maintains the weight requirement policy stated
above, neither of the weight restrictions would be allowed because they
are based on sex-stereotypes and therefore discriminate against
employees “because of sex.”
Further, as Miller pointed out in his article, the unequal burdens
approach fails to address the persistence of sex stereotypes by only
weighting time and costs and ignoring the degrading and discriminatory
prejudices that stereotypes have.141 By only focusing on whether a

137. EEOC v. R.G., No. 16-2424, 23, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5720 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018).
138. Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1110.
139. Id.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
141. William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit's Unequal Burdens
Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1357,
1367 (2006).
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grooming requirement is more expensive or time consuming on one sex
against the other, courts that follow the undue burdens approach miss the
whole point of Title VII, which is to get rid of workplace discrimination.
The undue burden test is flawed because it allows workplace
discrimination to occur so long as it is evenly distributed among the sexes.
C. Employers with a “Real” Reason to Discriminate Already Have an
Avenue to Do So.
Title VII forbids employers from discriminating on the bases if age,
race, sex, or place of origin.142 An exception to this statute is the bona fide
occupational qualification defense (“BFOQ”). Under this narrow defense,
an employer is allowed to discriminate against an employee on the basis
on his religion, sex, or national origin.143 For example, the Supreme Court
in Dothard stated that an employer could successfully plead a BFOQ
defense if the essence or central mission of its business would be
undermined by hiring members of both sexes and if there is no factual
basis for believing that all or substantially all persons of one gender could
not perform the job duties safely and efficiently.144
Applying both relevant BFOQ tests to the facts in Jespersen leads to
the conclusion that the BFOQ defense was not available to Harrah. Harrah
ran a casino in Nevada and employed Ms. Jespersen as a bartender.145 For
years, Ms. Jespersen was regarded as being excellent at her job.146
Problems arose, however, when Harrah began to implement a grooming
policy which, in part, required women to wear makeup and men to keep
their hair short.147
Under the “all or substantially all” test, Harrah would need to show that
all or substantially all protected members would be unable to fulfill the
requisite job duties without wearing the makeup. This variation of the test
is appropriate as it attempts to excuse Harrah’s discriminating policy.
Harrah is not saying that only men or only women can do this job. Harrah,
through their overall policy, is saying that, as part of the polished look it
wants its employees to display, women need to wear makeup.148 As noted
above, Price Waterhouse held that employers cannot discriminate against
employees based on a stereotype.149 The stereotype at issue here is that

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Note that race is not included.
Id.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 251 (1989).
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women need to wear makeup to look polished or professional. Given that
Ms. Jespersen satisfactorily performed her job as a bartender and that she
was well liked by customers,150 it is impossible for Harrah to successfully
assert that Ms. Jespersen, and all other female employees, need to wear
makeup to fulfill the requisite job duties. Thus, the BFOQ defense under
the all or substantially all test is not available to Harrah.
Applying the “essence of the business” test with a slight variation to
make the test fit Harrah’s makeup requirement yields the following:
discrimination based on sex stereotype is valid only when the essence of
the business operation would be undermined by adhering to that
stereotype. Harrah would again be unable to make this showing. The
essence of Harrah’s business is to run a casino.151 Bartenders are a key
component of that business as guests frequently consume alcohol when
they gamble. It does not follow, however, that Harrah’s makeup
requirement is essential to the operation of a casino or bar. The main
function of those business components is to serve customers. Ms.
Jespersen had been a good bartender for Harrah for twenty years and had
been regarded as an exemplary employee.152 Her employment was not an
issue until Harrah implement the makeup requirement.153 Because Ms.
Jespersen was regarded as an exemplary employee prior to the makeup
requirement, it would be nearly impossible for Harrah to successfully
argue that the makeup requirement is essential to its business. Therefore,
the essence of the business defense would not be available to Harrah.
Given the existence of the BFOQ defense to employee discrimination,
it is unnecessary, and contrary to legislative intent, to have the courtcreated undue burdens tests as well. By creating the BFOQ, the legislature
gave an employer a route to “legal” discrimination.154 Had the legislature
intended to create another avenue to “legal” discrimination, they would
have explicitly done so. However, the legislature did not. The intent of
Title VII was to rid discrimination from places of employment.155 The
BFOQ defense was carved out for the businesses that cannot function
without some type of necessary discrimination.156 The BFOQ is a very
narrow defense, further highlighting the legislature’s concerns with
allowing workplace discrimination. Why, then, would it be permissible to
discriminate on the basis of sex if the discrimination does not create an
undue burden on one sex? It is clear that men and women are anatomically
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id. 1108.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
42 U.S. Code § 2000e-2.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
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different. However, a functioning workplace does not need to adhere to
this difference for it to run well. This is evidenced in Harrah’s own
business, where Ms. Jespersen was an exemplary bartender without any
major issues.157 Her job performance and her relationship with Harrah
only deteriorated after the makeup policy was incorporated.158 If
anything, there is a strong argument that Harrah’s makeup requirement
hurt Harrah’s business as it lost a well-qualified and exemplary employee.
In conclusion, the legislature enacted Title VII to remove
discrimination from the workplace. In doing so, it realized that some
businesses needed to be able to discriminate in order to operate properly
and therefore created the BFOQ defense. It does not follow then, that the
legislature intended businesses to discriminate against their employees by
burdening both sexes. The undue burdens test is a judicially-created test
and is widely used by some circuit courts. Its use is perfectly acceptable
if the burdens placed on the sexes are not discriminatory nor based on a
stereotype. However, when the burdens placed on each sex are based on
stereotypes, as is the case in Jespersen, the undue burdens test runs afoul
of Title VII and the BFOQ defense. Finally, the undue burdens test also
creates an avenue towards discrimination not contemplated by the
legislature.
D. Jespersen was Incorrectly Decided Under the Undue Burdens
Approach.
Even if, in the future, the Supreme Court rules that the undue burdens
approach is legal discrimination, the Ninth Circuit still wrongly decided
Jespersen. In Jespersen, Ms. Jespersen decided to not bring forth
evidence on how the makeup requirement placed an undue burden upon
her.159 Ms. Jespersen also failed to provide evidence suggesting that
Harrah’s motivations were to stereotype the women bartenders.160 In
hindsight, this was a fatal mistake. Whether this was due to poor
lawyering or Ms. Jespersen’s own faulty judgment is unclear. What is
clear, however, is that had she provided some evidence on either of these
issues, she might have had an easier time convincing the court that
Harrah’s policy was discriminatory. Instead, Ms. Jespersen opted to rely
solely on evidence that she had been a good bartender and that she had
personal objections to complying with the policy. 161
Ms. Jespersen did ask the court to take judicial notice that it takes more
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1107.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id.
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time and it costs more money for women to comply with the makeup
requirement than it does for men to comply with the hair length
requirements.162 Perhaps Ms. Jespersen assumed that the court would
grant such request because the difference between the requirements is
evident. It does not take an expert to conclude that it costs more time and
money for the average female to purchase and put on makeup than it takes
for an average male to get a haircut. For instance, fashion magazine
People reports that the average woman spends about $15,000 on makeup
in their lifetime.163 Though this figure highlights the costs for women who
voluntarily wear makeup, it also shows that the “average” user spends a
significant amount of money on makeup. Further, data from a mobile
payment company called “Square” shows that the average haircut for men
costs $28 nationwide, while the average haircut for women costs $44.164
Even assuming that men cut their hair more often than women do, under
Harrah’s policy, a woman has to bear the costs of both her more
expensive, but less frequent hair-cut and the cost and time associated with
purchasing and putting on makeup. Whereas men only need to comply
with the less costly, more frequent hair-cut requirement.
Regardless of the statistics or of the self-evident difference in the
policy’s requirements, the Ninth Circuit noted that making this
determination was not appropriate under the judicial notice doctrine.165
The court stated that judicial notice is reserved for matters “generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or “capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.”166 The court stated that the time and
cost of makeup and haircuts did not fit in either category and that judicial
notice will not be used to cure Ms. Jespersen’s failure to provide the trial
court with relevant evidence regarding the time and cost of makeup and
haircuts.167
The Ninth Circuit relied on its own judicial notice criteria of “matters
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or
“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”168 Under either, it is still selfevident that it takes more time and more money for women to comply
with Harrah’s policy than it does for men.
162. Id. at 1110.
163. Colleen Kratofil, Can You Guess How Much a Woman Spends on Makeup In Her Lifetime,
(Mar. 30, 2017), People, http://people.com/style/how-much-does-a-woman-spend-on-makeup/.
164. Julie Zeveloff, This Map Shows What a Haircut Costs Around the US, (Mar. 3, 2014), Business
Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/haircut-cost-around-us-map-2014-3.
165. Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1110.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Judge Kozinski, dissenting in Jespersen, pointed out that the policy is
more burdensome for women than it is for men. His main concern was
“by how much?”169 Judge Kozinski acknowledged that Ms. Jespersen
failed to provide evidence and that it would have been a tidier case had
she done so. He also stated that there is no doubt that putting on makeup
requires more time and money.170 He commented, “[y]ou don't need an
expert witness to figure out that [face powder, blush, mascara and lipstick]
don’t grow on trees,”171 and concluded that the court could and should
have taken judicial notice of these facts.
In sum, even under the undue burdens approach, the Ninth Circuit
wrongly decided Jespersen because Harrah’s policy clearly burdens
women more than men. Women not only must keep their hair styled but
they also have to purchase and wear makeup, while men only have to keep
their hair short. Also, there is no equivalent male requirement. As Judge
Kozinski noted, the court should have taken judicial notice of these facts.
Had it done so, it would have found that Harrah’s policy burdened females
more than males and therefore violating Title VII, even under the undue
burdens approach.
E. Proposed Solutions to Appearance and Grooming Codes.
Given the different approaches the circuit courts apply to dress and
grooming codes, employers can easily run afoul of Title VII if they base
their dress and grooming policies on sex stereotypes. One common sense
solution is to make dress and grooming policies 100% sex neutral. For
instance, Harrah could have made a policy in which it describes what a
polished employee looks like without referencing sex. Harrah could issue
unisex standard uniform and require all employees to be “clean and
polished.” It could say that hair is supposed to be kept “neat and combed”
and that nails should be clean. It does not need to state sex specific
requirements as it did in Jespersen.
If Harrah really believed that the make-up requirement was essential to
its business, then it can make wearing makeup a requirement for all
bartender employees, male and female alike. Though it might seem odd
to require men to wear makeup, men’s use of makeup is not uncommon
as male news reporters and other TV personalities use makeup while still
maintaining a polished and professional look. Requiring all bartenders to
wear makeup does not violate Title VII under the undue burdens approach
or the Price Waterhouse approach. Because the makeup requirement is a
burden placed on both sexes, it would not place an undue burden on one
169. Id. at 1116.
170. Id. at 1117.
171. Id.
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sex. Similarly, because the employer is not basing the makeup
requirement on the stereotype that women ought to wear makeup, and by
requiring every bartender to wear it, the employer would not be acting
based on sex or a sex stereotype.
Another solution would be to first apply the reasoning in Price
Waterhouse and then use the undue burdens test. In his article, William
Miller details this approach.172 He argued that by using the two-prong
standard, courts will be able to differentiate grooming standards based on
harmful sex stereotypes from benign sex-differentiated grooming
standards.173 He provided the example of men being required to wear
suits.174 It is a stereotype that professional men are to wear suits.
Traditionally, this attire is worn by men to convey confidence and
command respect. While clearly based on a sex specific stereotype, this
requirement does not demean or stigmatize those abiding by it. On the
other hand, an appearance standard requiring women to wear skirts may
be based on the stereotype that women should have sex appeal.175 Unlike
the suit requirement for men, the skirt requirement is based on a sex
stereotype that is harmful and hardy benign.
In the end, whether it’s through neutral policy or through a two-prong
approach using both the Price Waterhouse language forbidding
discrimination based on a stereotype and the undue burdens test, solutions
do exist. Until either the legislature or the Supreme Court clarifies the
appropriateness of the undue burdens, employers should be mindful of the
potential legal consequences grooming and appearance policies can yield.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jespersen is flawed in multiple ways.
First, it’s reliance on the undue burdens test is inconsistent with Price
Waterhouse, a Supreme Court decision with expressly forbid sex
discrimination based on harmful sex stereotypes. In Jespersen, defendant
Harrah’s policy requiring women to wear makeup was based on the
harmful stereotype that women need makeup to look polished and
professional.
Second, the undue burdens test itself is flawed because it allows for sex
discrimination to occur as long both sexes are affected evenly. This result
is in direct conflict with Title VII, which sought to eliminate
discrimination from the workplace. Title VII created a very narrow
exception, allowing employers to discriminate through the bona fide
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1366-7.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1367.
Id.
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occupational qualification defense (“BFOQ”). The defendant in
Jespersen would not be able to successfully plead any variation of the
BFOQ as their makeup requirement is not an essential function of their
business. Ms. Jespersen worked for the defendant for over twenty years,
prior the makeup requirement, in an exemplary manner and without
issues. The makeup requirement did not enhance the business or Ms.
Jespersen’s performance. In fact, the makeup requirement hurt Harrah’s
business as it lost a very good employee. In Jespersen, the undue burdens
test functioned as another avenue to discrimination, something Title VII
does not condone given the narrowness of the BFOQ defense.
Further, even assuming that the undue burdens test is consistent with
Title VII and with Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Jespersen is still flawed because the makeup requirement does place an
undue burden on female employees. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Ms.
Jespersen was not entitled to judicial notice on the fact that it costs women
more money and more time to comply with the makeup requirement than
it does for men to comply with the short hair requirement. However,
judicial notice should have been granted given how clear and obvious the
discrepancies between the requirements are. A dissenting judge in
Jespersen agreed with this proposition, stating that while the case would
have been tidier with evidence, taking judicial notice on the cost and time
discrepancies was well within the court’s ability. The makeup
requirement clearly placed an undue burden on female employees and the
court should have granted judicial notice despite Ms. Jespersen’s lack of
evidence.
Given the problems that the undue burdens approach can yield,
employers would be wise to either enforce neutral grooming and
appearance policies or to perform preliminary checks for harmful
stereotypes before placing a burden on any sex. However, until the
Supreme Court takes a case dealing with undue burdens test and its
compatibility with Title VII, or the legislature clarifies its intent,
employers in most circuits will be allowed to discriminate based on
stereotypes as long the opposite sex has a different, but equal, burden
placed on them. As society continues to seek workplace equality, the
issues presented in cases like Jespersen will continue to gain relevance in
the public’s eye. Perhaps a clear answer is on the horizon.
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